Different than the Sum of its Parts:
Examining the Unique Impacts of Immigrant Groups on Neighborhood Crime Rates There has been a veritable explosion of studies on the relationship between immigration and crime. The literature has produced one of the most robust findings in the field: neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants have lower rates of crime. One drawback of this research is that it typically treats immigrants as a homogeneous population and fails to account for significant variation among immigrants. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region, this study builds on existing literature by unpacking immigration and accounting for the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. We capture this diversity using three different approaches, operationalizing immigrant groups by similar racial/ethnic categories, areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classifications. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach, which combines immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born. The results reveal that considerable insights are gained by distinguishing between diverse groups of immigrants. In particular, we find that all three strategies explained neighborhood crime levels better than the traditional approach. The findings underscore the necessity of disaggregating immigrant groups when exploring the immigration-crime relationship.
3 crime relationship that warrant further examination. One of the most critical issues worth addressing, we argue, is that aggregate-level research treats immigrants as a homogeneous population, which fails to account for significant variation across types of immigrants and neglects fundamental differences across groups.
The current study addresses this gap in the literature. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region-a racially and ethnically heterogeneous region with over 20 million persons that has received, and continues to receive, a large influx of immigrants-this study builds on existing literature by unpacking immigration and accounting for the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. Our research captures this diversity using three different approaches, operationalizing immigrant groups by 1) similar racial/ethnic categories, 2) areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and 3) where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classification schemes. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach employed in the literature, which combines immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born. Findings from this study address a variety of research questions: Does the relationship between immigration and crime vary across particular immigrant groups? If so, which groups exhibit crime reducing or crime enhancing effects on neighborhoods? And given the findings, what might be the most appropriate method of categorizing immigrant populations in future research?
Before presenting the study's methodology and results, we describe key findings from the literature, discuss theoretical explanations that account for these findings, explain why the typical approach used in studies may limit what we know about crime and immigration, and describe how the current study attempts to address this shortcoming. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings as well as future directions for research.
Theoretical Explanations
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In his 2012 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, Robert Sampson (2013) identified five substantive problems facing the field of criminology. One of them-the dilemma of race and the new diversity-reminds us that Black-White distinctions are not sufficient for examining 21 st century America. Immigration has reshaped the country and the world in ways that demand criminological attention. Sampson raised a series of questions worthy of scrutiny, among them "What is the macrolevel effect of immigration on U.S. crime rates?" (pg. 14).
As noted earlier, the field is already closing in on an answer to this question: areas, and especially neighborhoods, with greater concentrations of immigrants typically have lower rates of crime and violence when controlling for standard neighborhood covariates of crime. This finding, according to the collective literature, holds true for various outcomes (e.g., violent crime, property crime, delinquency) and remains strong across both cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches (Ousey and Kubrin 2009, 2014; Stowell et al. 2009; Martinez et al. 2010; Wadsworth 2010) .
Despite public perceptions to the contrary, there are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that immigrants are less likely to engage in crime relative to the native-born and that immigration to an area may decrease crime rates. For one, immigrants are not representative of all people from their respective countries of origin; rather, immigrants are a self-selected group. Those who travel to the United States usually do so in pursuit of employment opportunities and better lives (Van Hook and Bean 2009) . As a result, these individuals are often highly motivated, hardworking, and goal-oriented. Consistent with these immigrant selective effects, research commonly finds that immigrants have low criminal propensities (Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012:150; Stowell, Messner, McGeever, and Raffalovich 2009) . Because criminal convictions can lead to deportation for immigrants, even documented residents, those who wish to remain in the country are likely to have a greater stake in conformity. Similarly, the threat of deportation may deter immigrants from committing crime (Butcher and Piehl 1998a:672) . These arguments suggest that the foreign-born will engage in less crime than the native-born and that places with greater immigrant concentrations will have comparatively lower crime rates.
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Another argument suggests the protective effects of ethnic enclaves, or areas with high concentrations of immigrants often characterized by strong social ties among residents, intricate social networks, small businesses that provide jobs, and high levels of informal social control. Ethnic enclaves can provide immigrants with a sense of home, enhancing social ties among residents. Some scholars describe immigrant communities as "little worlds" that foster positive relationships with like-minded and culturally similar individuals (Breton 1964) . For example, Mazumdar and colleagues (2000) examine Vietnamese Americans in Little Saigon and describe how ingrained social activities combine with elements of the physical environment, such as architectural design, to cultivate strong ties and relationships between residents. Moreover, co-ethnic communities can promote dense networks of "localized ties" that provide immigrant families with social capital (Guest and Wierzbicki 1999:109) .
The limited financial means of many immigrants make these strong networks vital in successfully adapting to a new environment, especially in terms of employment. As Waters and Eschbach (1995:437) explain, "When immigrants enter a new society they often face barriers to full inclusion in the economic activities of the host society. Besides through outright discrimination, this occurs, for example, because of the absence of network ties necessary to gain access to or to succeed in certain kinds of activities, because of barriers to entry to professional or internal labor markets that have the effect of excluding those with foreign credentials, because the skills of immigrants are concentrated in specific occupations, and because these skills may not be well matched to the needs of the employers in the host society." Ethnic social networks can help to bypass these barriers, however, by providing informal recruitment opportunities, onthe-job training, and an encouraging atmosphere for new businesses (Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Phillips and Massey 2000) . Additionally, employment through ethnic enclaves offers greater human capital than would be found in the outside secondary labor market (Waters and Eschbach 1995:438) . Despite often being low wage positions, these jobs provide income and help to mitigate poverty, which is a strong correlate of crime and delinquency (Desmond and Kubrin 2009:586) . To this effect, Engbersen and van der Leun (2001:51) argue that illegal immigrants' embeddedness in the labor sphere explains their relatively limited involvement in crime.
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Although earlier versions of social disorganization theory suggest that immigration leads to heightened crime rates due to residential turnover, weakened social ties, and decreased informal social control, scholars have been challenging these claims and arguing instead that immigration can lead to revitalization and enhanced social control. Called the immigration revitalization thesis, this argument maintains that immigration is essential to the continued viability of urban areas, especially areas that have experienced population decline and deindustrialization (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001:564 ; see also Lee and Martinez 2002) . Portes and Stepick (1993) provide an example, discussing how immigrants helped to stabilize and revitalize Miami's economic and cultural institutions. In effect, strong familial and neighborhood institutions within ethnic enclaves as well as enhanced job opportunities promote greater development and stability: "…larger immigrant populations in metropolitan areas may invigorate local economies leading to redevelopment of the stagnating economies of the urban core of metropolitan areas.
The causal process by which the size of the immigrant population could lessen crime is via job growth, both for immigrants and the native-born; business development in previously economically depressed areas; and the repopulation of the urban core" (Reid et al. 2005:762) .
A final perspective suggests that family structure helps account for why immigration to an area may decrease crime rates. Criminological research consistently finds that single-parent households and areas with higher rates of single-parent families are associated with higher levels of crime (Sampson 1987) . The breakdown in traditional family structures, this scholarship argues, exhausts social capital and attenuates processes of socialization and informal social control (Land, McCall and Cohen 1990; Ousey 2000; Sampson 1987; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994 ). Yet, many scholars contend that immigration alters local family and household structures in ways that strengthen informal social control and prevent crime. Many immigrant groups have more familistic and pro-nuptial cultural orientations than the nativeborn (Fukuyama 1993; Oropesa 1996; Oropesa, Lichter and Anderson 1994; Vega 1990; Wildsmith 2004 ) and scholarship suggests that social networks in contemporary immigrant communities reinforce traditional (i.e., two parent) family structures and promote the legitimacy of parental authority norms (Martinez et al. 2004) . Immigrants' intact family structures and pro-family cultural orientations suggest 7 lower propensities toward crime compared to the native born and that increased immigration to an area will contribute to lower crime rates (Ousey and Kubrin 2009 ).
Re-conceptualizing Immigration
Despite generally consistent research findings on the immigration-crime relationship, critical questions and unresolved issues remain. Perhaps of greatest concern for the present paper is the unknown extent to which the immigration-crime relationship is truly generalizable or robust for all immigrant groups. Part of the uncertainty stems from researchers' narrow conceptual treatment of immigration along with the limited measures employed in studies. Nearly all macro-level research focuses on "immigrant concentration," generally defined as "the tendency of immigrants to concentrate geographically by ethnicity or origin within the host country" (Chiswick and Miller 2005:5) . Researchers frequently use a single measure of immigrant concentration: the percent foreign born in an area. Or, studies may combine several measures such as percent foreign-born, percent Latino, and percent persons who do not speak English well or at all to create an "immigrant concentration index" (Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; Lee and Martinez 2002; Lee et al. 2001; Martinez 2000; Martinez et al. 2004; Martinez et al. 2008; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Nielsen et al. 2005; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Reid et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2005; Stowell and Martinez 2007 ; but see Stowell and Martinez 2009 ).
The problem with these approaches is that they combine all immigrants together and neglect important between-group differences. By narrowly emphasizing the foreign-born-native-born comparison, researchers discount the widespread diversity that exists across immigrant groups. Yet over 80 years ago, Taft (1933:74-75) identified variation in arrest rates between immigrants of different nationalities as do some scholars today (Mears 2002:284) . For this reason, researchers advocate for a more complex treatment of immigration (Bursik 2006:29; Desmond and Kubrin 2009:601; Ousey and Kubrin 2009:467) .
Accounting for variation across immigrant groups is necessary for several reasons; first, not all immigrants migrate for the same reasons, reasons which, ultimately, may be associated with country of 8 origin or other factors such as race/ethnicity. Prior research finds that migration motives powerfully shape criminality and other indicators of successful adaptation (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000; Lee et al. 2001:573; Tonry 1997:24) .
Another layer of complexity is that immigrant groups vary by racial and ethnic identities, as well as nationalities. Long ago Taft (1933:74) Still another layer of complexity relates to the fact that certain immigrant groups may share common cultural traditions despite emigrating from different regions of the world. In such cases, we might observe that some immigrant groups are more likely to spatially co-locate in neighborhoods with other immigrant groups even if these groups do not share a common origin. This co-location might suggest similarity in cultural attitudes. For example, whereas many Muslims come from the Middle East, the country of Indonesia in Southeast Asia has the largest Muslim population in the world. Therefore, we might observe immigrants from Indonesia and immigrants from certain Middle Eastern countries colocating in neighborhoods due to religious similarity.
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A final consideration involves the role that heterogeneity of immigrant populations may play, an area of recent interest among scholars (Graif and Sampson 2009; LaFree and Bersani 2014) . Social disorganization theory maintains that neighborhood heterogeneity increases crime rates primarily by limiting the capacity of residents to effectively communicate with each other, form strong ties and networks, and achieve common goals such crime reduction (Kornhauser 1978; Kubrin 2000; LaFree and Bersani 2014; Shaw and McKay 1929 ). Yet in their study of immigration, diversity and homicide, Graif and Sampson (2009) propose that cultural diversity of immigrant populations within neighborhoods may actually benefit communities. This is especially likely, they suggest, if this diversity "increases the variety and complementarity of goods, skills, abilities and services…spurring innovation and creativity…cultural diffusion and hybridization" and inter-cultural tolerance (pg. 245), all of which, in turn, may promote conditions that prevent inter-group conflict and violence. Graif and Sampson (2009) find support for such an argument in their analysis of Chicago neighborhoods. Although varying in magnitude across the city's spatial landscape, they find that immigrant heterogeneity (as reflected in a measure of language diversity-see also LaFree and Bersani 2014) , is consistently associated with lower homicide rates, net of disadvantage, residential stability, population density, and other controls (pg. 251).
In sum, despite numerous studies finding that immigration and crime are negatively associated, the particularity of this relationship remains under-examined. The current study begins to address this limitation. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region, we build on the existing literature by unpacking immigration and capturing the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. Our methodological approach captures this diversity using several different approaches, including grouping immigrants by similar racial/ethnic categories, by areas or regions of the world immigrants emigrate from, and by where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classification schemes. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach employed in the literature, which aggregates all immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born.
Research Context
Our focus is on the Southern California region, a large and growing region that contains three metropolitan statistical areas: Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, the second largest metro area in the U.S. (12.8 million population); Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, the 12 th largest (4.2 million population); and San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, the 17 th largest (3.1 million population). The region we study includes five counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego), and 341 cities and minor civil divisions.
The Southern California region is an ideal setting for this study because, among other things, it is a growing region with over 20 million persons and it is a racially and ethnically heterogeneous area that has received, and continues to receive, a large inflow of immigrants. The history of immigration to this region is a long and varied one. In the first half of the 20 th century, white migrants set the dominant cultural tone in Southern California but beginning in the 1960s, immigration to the region increased substantially with migrants coming from a diverse array of countries. Very quickly the region attracted immigrants from around the globe. Today, Southern California is home to the largest concentrations of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Iranians, and other nationalities outside of their respective countries of origins (Rumbaut 2008:197) . Southern California is also home to sizable contingents of Armenians, Arabs, mainland Chinese, Hondurans, Indians, Laotians, and Russian and Israeli Jews (Rumbaut 2008:197) . These groups are typically spatially clustered. For example, the San Gabriel valley northeast of downtown Los Angeles has a large composition of different Asian immigrant groups, the city of Glendale (north of Los Angeles)
has a large Armenian enclave, and the Westminster/Garden Grove area of Orange County (known as "Little Saigon") has a large Vietnamese population.
Data and Methods
Data
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As part of a larger project, we made an effort to contact each police agency in the region and request point crime data from them, an arduous task. Many of the agencies were willing to share their data with us. As a consequence, we ended up with crime data for 2,740 of the 3,852 tracts in the region (these cover 219 of the 341 cities in the region). We geocoded the crime incidents to census tracts and then averaged crime events from 2009-11. We utilize tracts as our unit of analysis given that they approximate neighborhoods and because the Census does not provide detailed information on immigrants at units smaller than tracts (Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; MacDonald et al. 2012) .
Dependent variables
We created a count of violent crime events, which combines aggravated assault, robbery, and homicide events. We created a count of property crime events, which combines burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny events.
Independent variables
Our key independent variables capture the presence of immigrants in the tracts of our study area.
We conceptualized the presence of immigrants in tracts using four different approaches. The first approach follows the standard practice in the literature and computes a measure of the percentage of the tract population that is foreign born: percent immigrants. This measure does not make any distinctions among immigrants and instead treats them as a homogeneous group. The remaining three approaches all-in different ways-attempt to capture some of the important variation and layers of complexity discussed earlier. We fully acknowledge, however, that these approaches and their constituent measures constitute only rough proxies for many of the theoretical mechanisms proposed including migration motive, culture, assimilation, and so on, a point we return to at length in the Discussion and Conclusion section of the paper.
The second approach groups immigrants based on the racial/ethnic grouping that most characterizes, or is most representative of, the people from their country of origin. We determined this in a two-step process: first, we used the individual-level Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of residents in Southern California to assess the most common race/ethnicity reported by residents for a particular country of origin. For some countries such analyses are hardly necessary, as the analyses revealed that, for example, immigrants from most Latin American countries are typically Latino.
However, for some countries, it may not be so clear and these analyses allowed making a proper determination. In the second step, we used information on the country of origin (and the results of the first-step analyses) to compute measures of the tract population that is percent Asian immigrants, percent black immigrants, percent white immigrants, and percent Latino immigrants. Table A1 in the Appendix displays the racial group into which each country's immigrants are classified.
The third approach focuses on the region of the world from which the immigrants originate. We focuses on where they ultimately locate in the region. Here the idea is that any co-location in space among immigrant groups reflects some latent tendency towards similarity, whether it is similar values, cultural cues, or something else. We do not know what this latent tendency might be, and make no claim about what it may be, but rather use this inductive approach to detect these groups. In this approach, we took the 33 largest immigrant groups in the Southern California region, each of which constituted at least 13 3 percent of the immigrant population in the region, 1 and conducted a principal-component factor analysis. Afterward we performed an oblique rotation to more clearly align each immigrant group with a particular factor. We retained each factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (n=11) and each immigrant group with a factor loading of at least .3 was considered part of that factor. However, we emphasize that we did not use the factor loadings in the subsequent construction of the factor groups, but rather simply summed members of each country that were identified as part of a group. After summing, we computed the group's percentage of the total tract population. The resulting factors capture the tendency of certain immigrant groups to spatially co-locate in Southern California. These groups are: Chinese (China, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia); East Asian (Japan, Korea, Philippines, India); Southeast Asian asylum seekers In addition to these three sets of immigrant composition measures just described, we constructed measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these sets of variables. For each, we constructed a Herfindahl index, which is a measure of sums of squares for the proportion in each immigrant group.
Thus, we constructed measures of immigrant race/ethnicity heterogeneity, immigrant world area heterogeneity, and immigrant spatial co-location heterogeneity. We estimated models that included each of these measures, but they were never statistically significant, so we do not present these results.
To minimize the possibility of obtaining spurious results, we also included a set of measures that are commonly incorporated into ecological studies of crime. We constructed a measure of concentrated disadvantage, which combines the following measures in a factor analysis: 1) percent at or below 125% of the poverty level; 2) percent single parent households; 3) average household income; and 4) percent with at least a bachelor's degree. The latter two measures have negative loadings. We constructed a measure of residential stability by standardizing and summing two measures: 1) average length of residence and 2) percent homeowners. We account for possible racial/ethnic effects beyond those of immigrant groups by constructing measures of percent black and percent native Latino. The latter measure computes the number of Latinos in a tract, subtracts the number of foreign born from Latino origin countries, and divides by the total population. We account for racial mixing with a measure of racial/ethnic heterogeneity computed as a Herfindahl Index of five racial/ethnic groups (black, white, Asian, Latino, and other race). We account for the possible criminogenic effect of vacant housing units with the percent vacant units. A measure of the percent aged 16 to 29 captures those in the most crimeprone years. We also computed the population density of the tract. Finally, we accounted for the possible effect of land use characteristics. We constructed measures of the percent of the land area that is: 1) 15 industrial; 2) office; 3) residential; and, 4) retail. "Other land use types" (e.g., parks, churches, government buildings, parking structures, etc.) is the reference category.
To address potential spatial effects, we followed the approach of prior work (Kubrin and Hipp 2014; Peterson and Krivo 2010) and account for the demographic characteristics of nearby tracts. We created a spatial weights matrix based on an inverse distance decay function capped at five miles and multiplied this by the values of measures in these nearby tracts. We thus constructed spatial measures of: 1) concentrated disadvantage; 2) residential stability; 3) racial/ethnic heterogeneity; 4) percent black; 5) percent Latino; 6) percent occupied units; 7) percent aged 16 to 29. We display summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses in Table 1 . There was no missing data given that we are using Census data.
<<<Table 1 about here<<<
Methods
Given that the outcome variables are counts, we estimated Poisson models. We believe that our structural models are properly specified (Berk and MacDonald 2008) ; nonetheless we detected overdispersion. We account for this by using robust standard errors as suggested by Wooldridge (Wooldridge 2002) . We account for possible differences across city police departments in reporting practices by estimating fixed effects models with indicator variables for the cities in which the tracts are located. The estimated models are:
and x is a vector containing the variables of interest:
where I includes our various immigrant concentration measures, T contains the neighborhood control variables, WT contains the spatial lagged versions of the neighborhood control variables, and C contains an indicator of the city the tract is in.
We performed various diagnostics to assess whether our data violated any assumptions of the modeling strategy. There was no evidence of multicollinearity problems, as the variance inflation factor values were all below 5.9 (Kennedy 1998). We also performed several tests and found no evidence of influential cases. For example, we estimated separate models excluding tracts with populations of less than 300 or 500 and found similar results for each. We therefore used a tract population of 300 as a threshold for inclusion to minimize the number of observations excluded. We assessed possible influential cases by estimating ancillary models that excluded observations with the most extreme 1% of Hadi values. These results were essentially identical to those presented below.
We assessed spatial dependence by mapping the residuals from our models and found that our models essentially account for the spatial clustering of crime across the tracts in this sample. Although there is spatial correlation for violent and property crime, with Moran's I values of .16 and .05, respectively, the Moran's I values for the residuals (constructed as the difference between the crime count and the predicted crime count) of the violent and property crime models were .02 and .01, respectively.
Thus, there is effectively no spatial autocorrelation among the residuals after accounting for our model.
Results
Descriptive results
To gain a better understanding of what Southern California immigrant neighborhoods in our study look like for the various grouping strategies, we first compare socio-demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods. To do this, we selected neighborhoods in which at least 3 percent of the total population was of a particular group. Table 2 shows the socio-demographic characteristics for these neighborhoods based on the predominant race/ethnicity of the immigrant group, sorted in descending order by the average home value in the neighborhood. Immigrants from countries with predominantly white residents reside in neighborhoods in the Southern California region with the highest average income and home values and lowest violent and property crime rates compared to other immigrants. This is followed by immigrants from countries with predominantly Asian, black and Latino residents, respectively. It is notable that this categorization approach yields the fewest differences in socio-demographic characteristics across the immigrant neighborhoods in the study compared to the other two categorization strategies. Finally, going back to the second panel of Table 2 we display the summary statistics when grouping the immigrant groups based on co-location in the region. We see that the Anglo-Saxon, Muslim, 
Multivariate results
We now turn to results from the regression models. We first discuss findings from our baseline regression models, which mimic the common approach in the literature by including only a measure of the percent of the tract population that is foreign born (e.g., immigrant concentration). In model 1 of Table 4 , we see that immigrant concentration is not significantly associated with neighborhood violent crime. In model 1 of In the next set of models, we adopt a different strategy and disaggregate immigrant groups by 18 regions of origination (see Appendix Table A1 for classification). In model 3 of Table 4 , we find that four groups from different origins have significant negative relationships with violent crime rates (at least p In the property crime results in model 3 of Table 5 , three different groups are negatively related to property crime in Southern California neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with more immigrants from West Africa (b = -.0856) are associated with lower property crime rates. A one percentage point increase in immigrants from West Africa in a neighborhood is associated with an 8.2% lower property crime rate.
Neighborhoods with more immigrants from East Asia and South-east Asia also have modestly lower property crime rates. Two groups are associated with higher property crime rates: neighborhoods with 20 more immigrants from Southern Europe (b = .0649), the Caribbean (b = .0678); in each case a one percentage point increase in the group in a neighborhood is associated with nearly a 7% increase in the property crime rate.
A final set of models disaggregate immigrant groups based on their observed geographic clustering in the Southern California region (see Appendix Table A1 for categorization). In model 4 of Table 4 for violent crime, we find that three of the groups are positively associated with violent crime rates, whereas one is negatively associated with violent crime rates. Neighborhoods with more immigrants in the group we have labeled "Chinese" (from the countries China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia) have lower violent crime rates. On the other hand, neighborhoods with more immigrants from Mexico, from the countries in the "Jewish" group (Russia, Ukraine, Israel) and from countries in the "Central American asylum seekers group" (countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) have higher violent crime rates, holding constant the other measures in the model. A ten percentage point increase in immigrants from Mexico is associated with 8.7% more violent crimes, whereas a one percentage point increase in immigrants from the "Jewish" group is associated with 3% more violent crimes.
In the property crime models, we find that two of the groups are associated with lower property crime rates whereas just one is associated with higher property crime rates (model 4 of Table 5 ).
Neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries associated with the "Chinese" group have lower
property crime rates (model 4 of Table 5 ) as do neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries in the "Central American asylum seekers" group. However, neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries in the "New World" group (countries are Italy, Cuba, Ecuador) have higher property crime rates.
These three different approaches to conceptualizing immigrant groups all perform relatively similarly when viewing the immigrant neighborhoods and crime relationship. Importantly, all three of these alternative approaches out-performed the standard approach of including a single percent foreign born measure. Note that the lowest pseudo R-squared values for both violent and property crime models 21 are for the standard approach in the literature-the sole inclusion of a measure of immigrant concentration. Furthermore, statistical tests showed that these three alternative specifications were superior to the standard approach. We assessed this by performing a test after each estimated model in which we constrained our multiple measures of immigrant concentration to be equal (which is the assumption of the model including just percent foreign born). Constraining these coefficients equal always resulted in a very significant reduction in model fit: for the immigrant groupings based on race/ethnicity, the chi-square tests were 21.8 and 15.2 on 3 degrees of freedom for violent and property crime, respectively (p < .001 and p < .01). For the regions of the world measures the chi square results were 45.9 and 37.6 on 17 degrees of freedom (p < .001 and p < .01). For the co-location groups the results were 36.1 and 33.9 on 10 degrees of freedom (both p < .001).
We briefly mention the control variables only to note they have the expected relationships with crime that mirror the existing literature. Neighborhoods with greater concentrated disadvantage, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, percent black or Latino residents, and percent vacant units have higher violent crime rates, whereas higher population density is associated with less violent crime. Likewise, neighborhoods with more racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, and vacant units have higher property crime rates. Neighborhoods with more industrial and retail land use have more violent and property crime, whereas those with more office areas have more property crime, compared to other types of land use. For the spatial lag variables, neighborhoods surrounded by higher levels of vacant units have higher violent crime rates and those surrounded by more percent black have higher property crime rates.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study has argued for moving beyond a unitary conceptualization of immigration and instead considered the multidimensionality of immigrant groups and the consequences for neighborhood crime.
The results showed that considerable insights are gained by distinguishing between diverse groups of immigrants. In particular, we find that all three strategies for distinguishing between immigrant groups-by similar racial/ethnic categories, by areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and by where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S.-explained levels of neighborhood crime better than the traditional approach of including only a measure of the percent foreign-born in the neighborhood.
These findings underscore the necessity of disaggregating immigrant groups when exploring the immigration-crime relationship.
For both violent and property crime, we found that the models that did the best job (based on variance explained) disaggregated immigrant groups from where immigrants originate based upon the region of the world of the sending country. For example, whereas neighborhoods with more immigrants from West Africa had lower levels of both violent and property crime, there was no such relationship with more immigrants from East Africa, Mid Africa, or South Africa. Neighborhoods with more immigrants from the Middle East (North Africa) also had lower levels of violent crime. Neighborhoods with more Central American immigrants had higher violent crime rates, whereas neighborhoods with more immigrants from South Asia had lower violent crime rates and those with more immigrants from East Asia had lower property crime levels.
Another effective strategy for explaining levels of crime clustered immigrant groups based upon their co-location patterns with other groups in the Southern California metropolitan region. Recall we found that two of the factors, those we have labeled "Jewish" and "Mexico," are positively associated with violent crime rates, whereas two of the other factors, those we have labeled "Chinese" and "Central
American asylum seekers," are negatively associated with violent crime rates. These results are not determined by the socio-economic status (SES) of these immigrant groups: whereas the Jewish group have some of the highest income and education levels of these groupings, the Mexican immigrants have some of the lowest, and yet these groups each live in higher violent crime neighborhoods. 3 In the property crime models, we find that "Chinese" and "Central American asylum seekers" are associated with lower property crime rates whereas just the "New World" group is associated with higher property crime rates.
Again, SES is not a determining factor as the Chinese immigrants have relatively high SES whereas the asylum seekers have some of the lowest SES levels. It is worth noting that many of these groups were geographically clustered based on the sending country, suggesting minimal gain over an approach simply focusing on the region of origin for immigrants. Interestingly, however, the groups that were not geographically clustered based on sending country actually showed some robust effects: the Jewish factor was positively associated with violent crime, whereas the New World factor was positively associated with property crime. Perhaps in different research areas that do not have such large immigrant populations a strategy focusing on unobserved cultural factors that lead to certain groups co-locating in neighborhoods will be more consequential.
Whereas disaggregating immigrant groups based upon the predominant race/ethnicity backgrounds of immigrants was the least explanatory of crime locations of our three grouping strategies, it still improved over the default approach of lumping all immigrants together by using a measure of percent foreign-born. Recall the results reveal sharp distinctions among these groups; on the one hand, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Latino immigrants have higher violent crime rates while on the other hand, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of black or Asian immigrants have lower violent crime rates, controlling for the other measures in the model. The relationships between immigrants of differing racial/ethnic backgrounds and property crime also differ for various groups, as neighborhoods with more Asian immigrants had lower levels of property crime.
Despite the relative effectiveness of our three different strategies of disaggregating immigrant groups in detecting relationships with neighborhood levels of crime, we highlight that on the other hand there was no evidence that heterogeneity measures based on these classification schemes were statistically significant. Likewise, ancillary models using an immigrant heterogeneity measure based on the individual groups themselves also was not statistically significant. Thus, although we might expect based on the insights of social disorganization theory that such mixing based on immigrant groups would result in higher levels of crime, we found no such evidence here. This may imply that by adopting the approach we 24 did here of theoretically considering the similarities and differences across various immigrant subgroups that our approach indirectly accounts for what some might otherwise interpret as heterogeneity effects.
Of course we point out that the study's findings, regardless of grouping strategy, should be interpreted within the context of the study's limitations. These include a focus on only one region of the United States, which raises questions of generalizability; the fact that our data span a very short and specific time period (2009-11), which raises questions about whether the findings would be replicated in a different historical time period; and a lack of data to measure possible mediating factors (e.g., culture, religion), which may help explain or contextualize the findings. In addition, there are selection effect concerns in which poorer immigrants may be more likely to move into higher crime neighborhoods, which can impact parameter estimates in these cross-sectional models.
A crucial question is what accounts for these-in some cases drastic-differences in findings both within and across immigrant grouping strategies? How do we explain these results? Clearly a proper explanation requires much closer examination of the particular immigrant groups that comprise each grouping strategy, their motivations for emigrating to the U.S., and consideration of the commonalities among the immigrants with respect to, for example, religion, language, and culture than is possible in this paper. Given the diversity of findings, rather than attempt to explain each one, below we discuss two broader considerations that may help explain this diversity and that, we believe, warrant detailed investigation in future research.
Perhaps one of the strongest driving forces behind the findings relates to immigrants' reasons for migrating to the U.S. It should come as no surprise that the reasons groups migrate powerfully shape criminality and other indicators of successful adaptation (Tonry 1997:24) . Migration motive varies along several dimensions but one useful distinction is between economic and non-economic motives (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000; Lee et al. 2001:573) . Instructive here is economic theory on the international transferability of human capital (Chiswick 1978 (Chiswick , 1986 ; see Duleep and Regets 1997 for a formal model; see Borjas 1994 for an overview on the earnings assimilation of immigrants). Economic theory predicts that immigrants from countries that are similar to the host country with respect to 25 economic development, the schooling system, and language and culture are better able to assimilate into the labor market, largely due to a rapid transferability of the human capital they accumulated in their home country. Consequently, the theory predicts that these individuals will be less likely to commit crime.
As just one example, consider that non-economic migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees do not migrate for economic reasons but rather due to the political situation in their home country. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that these migrants do not fully plan migration and may not invest in advance in the transferability of their stock of human capital or in the country-specific human capital of the receiving nation. Hence, asylum seekers and refugees are likely to face greater earnings disadvantages compared to those who migrate for economic reasons, which has implications for their propensity to engage in crime. Stated alternatively, immigrants who are selected according to their skills are more likely to be successful in the labor market of the receiving country and to adapt more rapidly into the new economic environment as compared to chain migrants or refugees, which suggests they should be less likely to commit crime (Bauer et al. 2000) . Compounded with this, refugees from war torn countries often experience physical torture and suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, making adjustment into the new country even more challenging.
The implication of this discussion is that a fuller understanding of the findings of this study require comparing and contrasting immigrant groups based upon their motives to migrate to the U.S. One critical distinction, as just noted, is between those with an economic motive to migrate (e.g., workers) and those with a non-economic motive to migrate (e.g., refugees, asylum seekers). Our expectation is that Southern California neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants that migrate due to noneconomic motives will have higher crime rates, all else equal. We also suspect that variation in migration motive is strongly associated with different immigrant/immigration characteristics, such as the country of origin of different immigrant groups as well as their racial and ethnic composition. It is also the case there may be sharp contrasts between differing groups that migrate for the same general reason. In the context of an economic motive to migrate, for example, consider the fact that immigrants from India are far more 26 likely to enter the U.S. with a college degree than, for example, immigrants from Mexico or Ecuador (Zhou 2001) , a finding also true in Southern California. Indeed, the undocumented immigrant population in Southern California, as much of the U.S., is disproportionately comprised of poor young males who have recently arrived from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and a few other Latin American countries to work in low-wage jobs requiring little formal education (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007:4) . Differences such as these may account for some of the findings reported in the study.
Another explanation behind the study findings is likely linked to varying assimilation levels among the different immigrant groups both across and within grouping strategies. A firmly established finding in the literature is that immigrants are less crime-prone than their native-born counterparts A related observation from this research, however, is that the individual-level link between
immigrants and crime appears to wane across generations. That is, the children of immigrants who are born in the U.S. exhibit higher offending rates than their parents (Lopez and Miller 2011; Morenoff and Astor 2006:36; Rumbaut et al. 2006:72; Sampson et al. 2005; Taft 1933; Zhou and Bankston 1998) .
Relatedly, research finds that assimilated immigrants have higher rates of criminal involvement compared to unassimilated immigrants (Alvarez-Rivera, Nobles, and Lersch 2014; Bersani, Loughran, and Piquero 2014; Morenoff and Astor 2006:47; Zhou and Bankston 2006:124) . Findings such as these have led 27 scholars to describe an "assimilation paradox" (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007:2) , where the crime problem reflects "not the foreign born but their children" (Tonry 1997:20) .
These findings are puzzling to many because as traditionally theorized, the process of assimilation is hypothesized to involve acquisition by immigrants and their descendants of Englishlanguage proficiency, higher levels of education, valuable new job skills, and other attributes that ease their entry into U.S. society and improve their chances of economic success, thereby reducing-not increasing-criminal behavior. So how can we explain these counter-intuitive findings? One explanation focuses on the idea that assimilation presents a specific set of challenges, which increase the propensity to engage in crime: "Born or raised in the United States, they [the children of immigrants] inherit their immigrant parents' customs and circumstances but come of age with a distinctively American outlook and frame of reference and face the often-daunting task of fitting into the American mainstream while meeting their parents' expectations, learning the new language, doing well in school, and finding decent jobs" (Rumbaut et al. 2006: 65; see also Foner and Dreby 2011; Samaniego and Gonzalez 1999) .
Illustrating this challenge, a case study of Vietnamese youth living in a New Orleans' Vietnamese enclave reveals that children are subject to two opposing sets of contextual influences: "On the one hand, the ethnic community was tightly knit and encouraged behaviors such as respect for elders, diligence in work, and striving for upward social mobility into mainstream American society. The local American community, on the other hand, was socially marginalized and economically impoverished, and young people in it reacted to structural disadvantages by erecting oppositional subcultures to reject normative means to social mobility" (Zhou and Bankston 2006:119) . Fortunately, the family and broader community can help adjudicate the competing forces associated with assimilation. Zhou and Bankston (2006) find, for example, that "although Vietnamese young people lived in a socially marginal local environment they were shielded from the negative influences of that environment by being tightly bound up in a system of ethnic social relations providing both control and direction" (pg. 119-120), and conclude that "The more that families function to pull young people into the ethnic community and the more the ethnic community guides them toward normative orientations consistent with those of the larger society, the less those young people are drawn toward the alternative social circles of local youth" (pg. 136).
The implication of this discussion is that some of the variation in findings both within and across immigrant grouping strategies may be associated with differential assimilation levels among the immigrant groups. Those neighborhoods with higher concentrations of 2 nd and later generation immigrants, or more assimilated immigrants, are more likely to have higher crime rates, all else equal. Of course there are always exceptions to this, which will likely be the case for immigrants in Southern California neighborhoods. For example, research finds that self-selected economic migrants from many Asian cultures have lower crime rates than the resident population in the first and in subsequent generations (Tonry 1997:22) . This may or may not be true in the case of Asian immigrants in Southern California, especially because "The fact that most Vietnamese, Cambodians, Lao and Hmong arrived in the United States-California included-as refugees rather than as immigrants has made their adjustment here different from that of other Asian groups" (Allen and Turner 1997:154) .
Given space constraints, we have focused on motives for migration and levels of assimilation as two key factors that may help account for some of the findings of this study. However, we acknowledge additional factors are likely at play including, for example, the historical time period in which particular immigrant groups settled into the Southern California region. In line with Reid et al. (2005:762) , "it is quite possible that the relationship between immigration and crime is historically contingent." Indeed, "…ethnic groups in Southern California with a large proportion of immigrants may differ from each other in characteristics that relate to the timing of their arrival and modifications of U.S. law" (Allen and Turner 1997:39) , although what those differences are may be less obvious. Moreover, we recognize there is great variation among immigrant groups in terms of their levels of transnationalism, or of sustained social contacts over time and across national borders (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999) . Many immigrant groups in Southern California, but especially those from Mexico as well as Central and Latin America, retain active ties to their home countries even as they remain in the Southern California region. The effects of these multiple bonds on economic, social, and psychological integration and ethnic identity 29 formation-not to mention crime-are no doubt salient and warrant attention in future research. And finally there is the role of culture, which is notoriously difficult to measure let alone define. Yet we know that cultural differences between structurally similarly situated immigrants (and immigrants in structurally similar neighborhoods) can result in sharply different crime patters (Tonry 1997:23) .
In sum, explanations for the findings of this study are likely tremendously complex. Differences in immigrant cultural backgrounds and reasons for migration, as well as structural circumstances that contextualize migration and settlement experiences, no doubt play a role in making sense of the study's findings more specifically-even as they powerfully condition the relationship between immigration and crime more generally. Regardless of the explanations, this study has demonstrated the utility of moving beyond a unitary view of all immigrant groups as undifferentiated in understanding neighborhood crime rates. 
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